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A HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RIGHT TO TRIAL
BY JURY IN COMPLEX CIVIL LITIGATION *
Moius S. ARNoLD t

Readers of recent law reviews and reports will not need to be
told that in the last few years a very considerable controversy has
arisen over the availability of jury trial in complex civil cases.1
In all the commentary addressed to this issue it seems to have
escaped remark that there is nothing very new in attempts by certain interests to avoid jury trial. For instance, well over a century
ago Hunt's Merchants' Magazine lamented the "frequent inability

of jurors to agree" in commercial cases. 2 In part because "merchants tended to believe that in cases involving complex commercial issues . . . a single judge was likelier to understand the

case and thus be more reliable than a jury," they "preferred whenever possible to bring suit in equity." 3 We are today witnessing a
recrudescence of such efforts.
Some who argue that juries need not be employed in complicated civil litigation maintain that juries are incapable of rendering
* Professor Arnold's Article was commissioned by counsel for the plaintiffs in
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa.),
interlocutory appeal granted, No. 79-2540 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 1979) (argued Feb. 14,
1980), and was submitted in unedited form to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit in connection with that suit. Readers interested in an opposing viewpoint
on the history of the right to jury trial in complex civil litigation may wish to read
the Article by Lord Devlin, commissioned by counsel to the International Business
Machines Corporation, which appeared in 80 CoLum. L. BEv. 43 (1980), as well as
the reply to Professor Arnold by Messrs. Campbell and Le Podevin in the Discussion
section of this issue. [The Editors].
f Professor of Law and History, and Vice President-Director of the Office of
the President, University of Pennsylvania. B.S.E.E. 1965, LL.B. 1968, University
of Arkansas; LL.M. 1969, S.J.D. 1971, Harvard University.
I E.g., In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Pa. 1979),
interlocutory appeal granted, No. 79-2540 (3d Cir. Sept. 20, 1979) (argued Feb.
14, 1980); Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the
Seventh Amendment, 80 COLum. L. REv. 43 (1980); Comment, The Right to an
Incompetent Jury: Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment,
10 CoNN. L. REv. 775 (1978); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil
Litigation, 92 HAv. L. REv. 898 (1979); Note, Jury Trials in Complex Litigation,
53 ST. Jon's L. REv. 751 (1979); Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in
Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAw. L. REv. 99 (1979) (and cases cited therein at
99 n.2); Note, The Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation, 20 Wm. & MA y
L. REv. 329 (1978); Campbell, A Historical Basis for Banning Juries, Nat'l L.J.,
Feb. 11, 1980, at 17, col. 1.
2 DeForest, Trial by Jury in Commercial Cases, 35 HubT's Mxacftnsrrs MAC.
302, 304 (1856).
3T. FREXER, Fonums or ORDER: THE FEDmuL CounTs AND BusiN-ss nAmERucA HISTORY 40-41 (1979).
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intelligent and informed verdicts in complex cases; hence the
remedies at law are inadequate 4 and equitable jurisdiction appropriate.5 Because all the authorities seem to agree that the
right to jury trial in the federal courts is to be determined, at least
in part, by reference to the practices contemporaneous with the
adoption of the seventh amendment in 1791,6 proponents of the
"tcomplexity exception" have attempted to discover a historical
foundation for their theory. They purport to find in eighteenthcentury English law a well-established head of equity jurisdiction
that allowed the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, to insist on
avoiding jury trial in cases involving complicated facts.7 This
Article will attempt to show that this view is misconceived in a
number of important and fatal ways: not only is it a view at
odds with the current of American legal thought in the late
eighteenth century, it is also without general support in the English
authorities of that age."
I. EQurry

iN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA

Mr. Justice Story wrote in an opinion early in the nineteenth
century that the common law alluded to in the seventh amendment
was "[b]eyond all question .

.

. not the common law of any in-

dividual state, (for it probably differs in all), but it is the common
4

This argument confuses improbability with impossibility.

For a remedy at

law to be inadequate the just remedy must be unavailable to the plaintiff. For
example, an award of money damages would be inadequate for the disappointed
purchaser of land, because no two pieces of real property are alike. The just
remedy-an order transferring the property-would be impossible to obtain in a
court of law; hence the available remedy would be inadequate.
However limited the capacity of a jury to understand issues in complex litigation,
a just remedy at law is not unavailable to the plaintiff. Although the limitations of
the jury may indeed render a just and adequate remedy less probable than if the
suit were tried in equity, that remedy is nevertheless always a possible one.
The suggestion that the jury's lack of sophistication operates to deny the
plaintiff an adequate remedy at law is really a complaint about denial of due process,
dressed in the formality of the rules of pleading. A plaintiff seeking damages is
certainly in the right court, and properly before a jury. Whether a jury is the
best possible trier of fact is an issue unrelated to the adequacy of the remedy.
5 See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 1.
6 In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed

twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall otherwise be reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIL See, e.g., Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the
Seventh Amendment, 57 MwN,. L. REv. 639, 639-40 (1973).
7 Devlin, supra note 1, at 72 et seq.
8 This Article assumes, without addressing, the correctness of the view that the
scope of the seventh-amendment right to jury trial is determined by the distinction
between legal and equitable claims as it existed in 1791.
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law of England, the grand reservoir of all our jurisprudence." 9
This statement has been understood to mean that the right to jury
trial in the federal courts should be determined solely by reference
to the eighteenth-century English practice.' 0 In fact, however, the
exact question involved in the case before Story was whether federal
courts should apply the Massachusetts practice of giving a right to
jury trial on appeal. Story's dictum thus has no bearing on our
inquiry, for we are not concerned with what sort of jury trial the
Constitution would require in a case conceded to be at law; our
question is rather where the boundary between legal and equitable
jurisdiction lay at the time of the adoption of the seventh
amendment.
Although our focus is different from Story's, it is nevertheless
true that the line between law and equity may have been drawn
differently from colony to colony; we know, for instance, that in
the Confederation period, equity procedure differed somewhat from
place to place." Yet the variety of colonial and state practice in
the latter part of the eighteenth century is relevant to the question
of the scope of the seventh-amendment right in at least three ways.
First, and most important, it exposes to view the sentiment for and
attachment to trial by jury that Americans had in the nascent
period of the nation. That special affection for the jury ought to
be viewed as relevant not just to the fact that jury trial was "preserved" in the Constitution; it is relevant as well to interpreting
the scope of the actual provision, for it gives the right granted an
aura, and the Constitution a meaning, they would not otherwise
have if the institution of jury trial had been regarded more or less
indifferently. Second, especially in those places in which the
English brand of common law was consciously regarded as the
model to emulate, the American practice in 1791 is some evidence
of what Americans thought the English practice was. Third, the
United States Supreme Court has itself stated that the seventhamendment "guaranty has always been construed to mean a trial
in the mode and according to the settled rules of the common law,
including all the essential elements recognized in this country and
9United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No.
16,750).
'0 See Wolfram, supra note 6, at 639-42. "No federal case decided after
Wonson seems to have challenged this sweeping proclamation; perhaps later judges
have hesitated to appear to be the kind of intractable person that would require
Mr. Justice Story to elaborate on the obvious." Id. 641.
" See J. GOEBEr, 1 IhsTOR or = Supm'm Cou aT or nim UmTm STATES
580-89 (1971).
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England when the Constitution was adopted." 12 In an inquiry
intended to uncover the original understanding of those who
drafted and ratified the seventh amendment, eighteenth-century
American attitudes toward courts of equity cannot therefore be
unimportant. A short review of what can be discovered about
these matters will thus be attempted.
A. Equity and Trial by Jury

In The Federalist No.
self to be something of an
cussing the proposal for a
trial, he predicted that "to

83, Alexander Hamilton revealed himadmirer of equitable jurisdiction. Disconstitutional provision regarding jury
extend the jurisdiction of the courts of

law to matters of equity . . . will tend gradually to change the

nature of the courts of law, and to undermine the trial by jury, by
introducing questions too complicated for a decision in that
mode." 1 But there is every reason to think that Hamilton's views
on this matter were, as on some others, somewhat idiosyncratic.
Indeed, Professor Katz has said that "[flew American politicians of
the colonial era would have seen equity law and chancery courts in
such a favorable light." 14 Katz went on to note that "no colonial
legal institution was the object of such sustained and intense political opposition as the courts dispensing equity law." 15 Virtually
absent from the colonies in the seventeenth century, regular courts
of equity existed in only five of the thirteen original states in
1791; 16 and in the eighteenth century equity courts found themselves in the center of a storm of controversy. Much of this opposition was of a political character, focusing on the power to create
such courts, and the authority to appoint their members, rather
than the content of equity doctrine. 7 But much of the opposition
was also due to the unavailability of a jury in regular chancery
practice.'I Indeed, in some of the apparently "political" opposition
12 Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294
U.S. 648, 669 (1935).
isTim FEDERAiST No. 83, at 528 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
14
Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery
Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in 5 PERSPECTIVES r AmmuAc
HisToaRy 257, 257 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds. 1971).
15 Id. 257-58.
16 J. GonnEr., supra note 11, at 580.
17W. 1LwLE, EQVITY m PENNs LvANu 53-54 (Philadelphia 1868); Katz,
supra note 14, at 282-83.
'8L. FIaEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF AmEcAN LAw 47-48 (1973); Katz, supra
note 14, at 272; Smith & Hershkowitz, Courts of Equity in the Province of New
York: The Cosby Controversy, 1732-1736, 16 Am. J. OF LEAL HiST. 1, 50 (1972).
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to equity, opposition which emphasized the centralized character
of equity in contrast to the decentralized trials of the common law,
it is right to see an affection for the rough and tumble of nisi prius
verdicts in preference to a decision by one man alone. Juries were
often regarded as more than a "mode of trial": they were instruments of local government as well.
In New York, a good deal of the opposition to equity courts
was due to the lack of jury trials in those forums.'9 In the early
part of the century an enormous stir was occasioned by the litigadon between Governor William Cosby and Rip Van Dam over
which of them was entitled to the salary and perquisites of the
governorship. 20 When Cosby, through the power of his office,
maneuvered the controversy into the court of exchequer, many
thought that he had done so in order to avoid a jury trial.21 Moreover, Cosby's creation of a court of equity was perceived as motivated by a desire to deprive the colonists of their right to trial by
jury; 22 and some complained that "trials by juries are taken away
when a governor pleases." 23 Thus in early eighteenth-century
New York the popular association of equity with arbitrary power
may be readily established, and in the 1760s the right to trial by
jury was even more strenuously asserted and insisted upon in the
24
controversy over equity courts.
It would in fact be extremely surprising if the opposition to
chancery were not in some measure directly linked to the colonists'
high regard for the jury. As in medieval England, 25 juries in
eighteenth-century America had much more power to decide quesdons both of law and fact than do modern ones. This has been
documented best in the case of Massachusetts, 28 but there is good
reason to believe that the Massachusetts experience was in this respect not unlike that in most American colonies. 27 Most of the
19 Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 18, at 36-37.
20 See generally Katz, supra note 14, at 277-82; Smith & Hershkowitz, supra

note 18.
21 Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 18, at 19 n.49.
22 Id. 31-32.
23
New York Weekly Journal, No. 23, Apr. 8, 1734, reprinted in J. ALExANDmi,
A BRmF Nm.AraTvE or TEm CASE AN Tnmi. or JoHN PETER ZENGci app. A, at
134, 136 (S. Katz ed. 1963). See Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 18, at 40 &
n.100.
24 Smith & Hershkowitz, supra note 18, at 50.
25
See generally Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval Jury Trial: Out of
Sight,2 8Out of Mind, 18 Am. J. oF IEGAL IhsT. 267 (1974).
See generally W. NE sor, Tn AmBIcAN=A oN OF THE Com.xoN Lw
21-30,
165-71
(1975).
27
Nelson, The Eighteenth Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MicH. L. Rsv. 893, 904-17 (1978).
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jury-control techniques which modem lawyers take for granted were
simply unknown in early American practice, 28 and other technical
devices which have as their aim and effect the control of the jury
were unavailable as well. For instance, special pleading, the purpose of which is partly to circumscribe the jury's scope of operation
and thus to limit its discretion, was extremely rare.29 Many important eighteenth-century Americans recognized that this gave
juries the power and authority to decide law; indeed, they applauded that capacity. John Adams, using a metaphor which tells
us a great deal about the natural-law orientation of early Americans,
said that the common law was known to all "and imbibed with the
Nurses Milk and first Air." 30 Professor Nelson's description of the
effect of this view of the law is worth quoting at length:
Lawyers thus believed that juries should have the
power to find law, apparently so that they could serve
when needed as a restraint on judicial power. The lawfinding power of juries had a number of consequences,
however, that appear to have been unanticipated. One set
of consequences arose out of the fact that law found by
juries to fit the circumstances of individual cases has great
potential for flexibility, for records of jury determinations
of points of law are seldom preserved, and hence those
determinations do not become precedents with a binding
effect on future juries. In each case, a jury is free, if
justice requires, to reach the same result reached by other
juries in analogous cases in the past; if, on the other hand,
justice requires departure from past verdicts, the jury is
free so to depart. Moreover, no record is kept of such
departures, and therefore legal change and development
are imperceptible; men have the valuable illusion of legal
stability. Explicit rules of law, such as the rules of pleading considered above, remain unchanged, while substantive
law is still extremely flexible in its ability to adapt itself to
social needs in individual cases. The broad power of
juries to find law thus gave the legal system real flexibility
while simultaneously giving the illusion of stability-two
values that are important in doing justice in individual
cases and in convincing litigants that justice has been
done them.
The law-finding power of juries also made possible
adherence to the doctrine that judges-the agents of a
28 W. NELsoN, supra note 26, at 21-28.
29 Id. 21-23.
so LwA. PA-FERs OF JOHN AD ms 230 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
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potentially arbitrary executive-ought to follow precedent
and so not alter the rules of law. For, as we have seen,
the vast power of juries in general left judges with only a
few rather simple law tasks, such as instructing juries and
deciding pleading motions, which could be mechanically
performed by looking to precedent.
Most important, perhaps, the law-finding power of
juries meant that the representatives of local communities
assembled as jurors generally had effective power to control
the content of the province's substantive law. Because of
the power of juries, the legal system could not serve as an
instrument for the enforcement of coherent social policies
formulated by political authorities, either legislative or
executive, whether in Boston or in local communities,
when those policies were unacceptable to the men who
happened to be serving on a particular jury. The ultimate
power of juries thus raises the question whether the judgments rendered in the courts on a day-to-day basis were a
reflection more of law set out in statute books and in
English judicial precedents or of the custom of local
communities. 3 '
A distinguished historian of English law has lately noticed that
legal systems which delegate law-finding functions to laymen cannot
be anxious about producing a systematic substantive law, since they
give professionals so few occasions to review the legal significance
of facts.32 The allowance of such large latitude to laymen is jurisprudentially significant because it seems to reveal a society at home
with the notion that law and right are changeless truths discoverable by lawyers and laymen alike. In such a world law is a fact
like any other: all that is necessary for the resolution of a dispute
is for intelligent and moral people, free from the temptations of
corruption, to apply their minds to it in a reasonably diligent
fashion.
This is exactly the way the common law was conceived of in
eighteenth-century America,33 and this view of the law and of the
capacity of jurors had an impact on procedures in those eighteenthcentury American tribunals hearing equitable matters. Practice
before many of them took on a definite common-law cast. Chancery
jurisdiction and practice in early America still awaits its historian,
31 W. NELsoN, supra note 26, at 28 -29.
32 S. MEmsoM, HisToBicAL FOUNDATiONS oF THE COmmON LAw 26-38 (1969).
33

See M. Hoawrrz, TBE TRANsFoRmAmON or AmERcAN

at 4-9 (1977).

Lw, 1780-1860,

836

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 128:829

and until the records of the various jurisdictions become more
readily accessible, general conclusions in this area are a little hazardous. Some relevant items may be advanced with confidence, however, and they indicate a bias in favor of juries even in suits
in equity.
In Massachusetts, general equitable relief was unavailable in
any of the courts until almost one hundred years after the adoption
of the seventh amendment. 34 During the colonial period acts were
passed granting certain kinds of specific equitable powers to law
courts: in 1693, jurisdiction to chancer bonds was given; in 1698
and 1735, power to relieve against forfeiture by mortgagors was
granted; and in 1713 and 1719, jurisdiction was conferred over
redemption of lands after sale under an execution. 5 In all these
cases trial was by jury; and in 1791, no matters of fact material to
6
equitable issues were tried other than by jury
It is well known that Thomas Jefferson favored the use of
juries in chancery courts as authoritative determiners of the facts.
In a proposed constitution for Virginia that he composed in 1776,
Jefferson urged that "[a]ll facts in causes, whether of Chancery,
Common, Ecclesiastical, or Marine law, shall be tried by a jury
...
,,-7 Another Jefferson draft of 1783 contained a similar
recommendation. 8 The reports of George Wythe, America's first
law professor, indicate that juries were used in the Virginia High
Court of Chancery to fix the value of the thing in dispute,3 9 or to
determine the boundaries of real estate which was the subject of
litigation.40 Under this procedure the chancery court would "direct
an issue to be tried" by a jury in a common-law court and order a
report on the result to be sent up for scrutiny.4 ' While the use of
34 See generally Curran, The Struggle for Equity Jurisdiction in Massachusetts,
31 B.U. L. REv. 269, 269 (1951); Woodruff, Chancery in Massachusetts, 5 L.Q.
REv. 370, 383-84 (1889), reprintedin 9 B.U. L. IEv. 168, 181-82 (1929).
35 Woodruff, supra note 34, 5 L.Q. REV. at 376 n.2, 9 B.U. L. REv. at 174 n.26.
36 See the historical discussion by Justice Hammond in Parker v. Simpson, 180
Mass. 334, 349-50, 62 N.E. 401, 406-07 (1902).
87T. Jefferson, A Bill for new modelling the form of government, & for
establishing the fundamental principles thereof in future (before June 13, 1776)
(third draft of Jefferson's proposed Virginia Constitution), in 1 Tie PA.ERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 362 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
3
8 M. TACHAu, FEDERAL CouRTs iN THE EAmLy REPuBuc: IKEr=CKy 17891816, at 180 n.32 (1978).
99 Ross v. Pleasants, Shore & Co., Wythe 10, 22, 24 (Va. 1790) (commentary
on opinion and decree of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decree of the
High Court of Chancery) (value of tobacco exchanged for land); Hinde v.
Wythe 354, 357 (Va. Ch. 1791) (value of slaves auctioned fraudulently).
Pendleton,
40
Southall v. M'Keand, Wythe 95, 97-98 (Va. Ch. 1791) (summary of proceedings), ree'd in relevant part, 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 337 (1794).
41 For an example of the phrase, see Wythe 98.
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juries in equity courts in England was not unknown, the frequency
of resort to them, and the kinds of occasions on which resort would
be had, was evidently larger in Virginia. This was clearly the case
in Kentucky; a recent study of the federal court which sat there
beginning in 1789 has revealed frequent use of juries in equity
cases.4 2 The same can be said of Georgia in this period; that state
"allowed trial by jury in some causes which by tradition belonged
to the equity side of the bench." 43 A North Carolina statute enacted in 1782 had the same aim and effect."
William Penn, referring to the happy condition of the Indians
in Pennsylvania, noted in 1683 that they "are not disquieted with
bills of lading and exchange, nor perplexed with chancery suits." 45
And it is perhaps in Pennsylvania that one encounters the most extensive use of juries in chancery proceedings. There, except for a
brief period in the eighteenth century, equity was administered
entirely in the courts of law.46 Without chancery courts, it fell "to
the lot of Pennsylvania," William Rawle said in 1868, "through
necessity, to have blended together, in a single tribunal, equitable
principles and equitable jurisdiction, and to have dispensed those
principles through the medium of common law forms." 47 One of
the short-lived acts creating courts of equity in Pennsylvania demonstrates how careful one must be in interpreting historical evidence
of the times. In 1711, the common-pleas judges were empowered
to sit as a court of equity four times yearly, with instructions to
observe "as near as may be, the rules and practice of the high court
of chancery in Great Britain." 48 Without more, this would lead to
the conclusion that a jury would not ordinarily be employed. But
the act went on to provide that "when matters of fact should arise
in the hearing of any cause, the court should first refer them to issue
and trial before the Common Pleas, before proceeding to decree
in equity." 49
The lack of equitable remedies in Pennsylvania meant that the
common-law courts had to improvise when persons sought enforce42M. TAcnu, supra note 38, at 179-82.
3
4 L. Fsm m.A, supra note 18, at 131.
44Id. (citing ch. 11, 1782 N.C. Laws).
45 Letter from William Penn to the Free Society of Traders (Aug. 16, 1683),
reprinted in 1 R. PRouD, IsToRY OF PENNSyLvANIA 246, 255 (Philadelphia 1797).
46

Liverant & Hitchler, A History of Equity in Pennsylvania, 37 DiCK. L. REv.
156, 162, 165 (1933).
47W. RAwzs, supra note 17, at 2 (emphasis in original).
4
s An Act for Establishing Courts of Judicature in this Province, Feb. 28, 1711,
ch. 168, §25, 2 Pa. Stat. (1682-1801), at 301 (repealed' 1713), quoted in
W. RAwLE, supra note 17, at 16.
49 W. RwLE, supra note 17, at 17.
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ment of equitable rights. Thus Horace Binney could say that this
difficulty "taught us how to clothe a large body of equity principles
in the drapery of the law." 50 For instance, if specific performance
was sought, a substitute for an injunction had to be found, so
eighteenth-century Pennsylvania courts granted "conditional damages, so large in amount, that the defendant finds it to his advantage
to yield to the plantiff the equity which is the subject of the suit." 61
A case decided in 1791 nicely illustrates the use of this device. 52
If specific performance of a land-sale contract was sought, then
ejectment, a real action at common law offering specific recovery
of the realty, was made available; 5 likewise, replevin could effect
the recovery of a chattel owed.54 And so, "by an ingenious and
liberal use of

.

.

. common law methods," 15 the common-law

courts of Pennsylvania fashioned equitable remedies for the vindication of equitable rights.
B. Complexity as a Head of Equity Jurisdiction

As noted before, early American chancery records have not yet
been fully mined for the information they may contain, and general
statements are therefore somewhat difficult. But it is nevertheless
clear that no case of that period yet printed indicates a willingness
on the part of the chancellor to assume jurisdiction because of a
matter's alleged unsuitability for trial before a jury. It is true that
after the seventh amendment was passed, nineteenth-century courts
occasionally claimed that the basis for jurisdiction over suits for
accounting in equity was the impracticality of trying them before
a jury 6 But no eighteenth-century American court, so far as we
50 H. Binney, An Eulogium upon the Hon. William Tilghman, Late Chief
Justice of Pennsylvania (Oct. 13, 1827) (address to the Bar of Philadelphia),
published in 16 Serg. & Bawl. 439, 449 (Pa. 1827).
& 48 (Philadelphia 1826).
51A. LAUSSAT, AN EssA oN EQurr IN PmmsmvNL
52 Clyde v. Clyde, 1 Yeates 92 (Pa. 1791).
53W. RAwLE, supra note 17, at 61-62.

54Id. 62.
55A. LAUssAT, supra note 51, at 57.
56E.g., President of the Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Polk, 1 Del. Ch. 167,
175-76 (1821):

Is this such a case that the parties should be decreed to account?
Upon that point I have no doubt. These transactions are so complicated,
so long and intricate, that it is impossible for a jury to examine them with
accuracy. They will require time, assiduous attention and minute
investigation, and are involved in so much confusion and difficulty that
no other tribunal, by reason of the forms of proceeding of the courts of

law, can afford the plaintiff a remedy.

See Ludlow v. Simond, 2 Cai. Cas. 1, 52 (N.Y. 1805) ("The settlement of
accounts, if they are in any degree long or complex, is improper, if not im-
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can tell, so held. A South Carolina case initiated in 1717," asking
for an accounting in a partnership setting, has indeed been cited as
an example of equity jurisdiction's being premised upon the complexity of the facts. 58 Examination of the pleadings, however, reveals an entirely different basis for the jurisdiction: the need for
the discovery and subpoena power of equity that was unavailable in
the common-law courts. Plaintiff concluded her bill for equitable
relief as follows:
All which Actings and doeings of the said Francis LeBrasseur [the defendant] are contrary to all Equity and good
Conscience and Ministers Fresh occasion of Sorrow and
Affliction to your Oratrix's late great Misfortunes well
known to this Honourable Court In tender Consideration
whereof and for that your Oratrix is wholly remediless in
the premisses at the Common Law for that your Oratrix
cannot by any Action at Law Compel the said Francis
LeBrassuer [sic] to produce his said Books of Accounts and
Consequently cannot Ascertain her Damages to a Jury
occasioned by the said LeBrassuer [sic] his breach of the
Covenant of the aforesaid Indenture of Copartnershipnor
can your Oratrix Sufficiently prove at Common Law the
said Collaterall Verbal Agreement or the Stock advanced
by your Oratrix pursuant thereunto or the profits accrewing to your Oratrix therefrom without Sight Perusal and
Examination of said Books of Accounts . . . . Wherefore . . .May it please your Honours to Grant unto your

Oratrix the Writt of Subpena to be Directed to the said
Francis LeBrasseur .

.

. and Alsoe to Grant unto your

Oratrix the Writt of Duces tecum to be directed to the said
Francis LeBrasseur requiring him at a Certain Day to
bring in and Deposit in this Honourable Court all the said
Old partnership Books of Accounts . . . And all papers

Minuments and Writings relating to the said Copartnership . . 59
practicable for a jury."). For discussion of difficulties in accounting cases, see
text accompanying notes 92-96 infra.
57Bill of Complaint, Wright v. LeBrasseur (filed Sept. 23, 1717), reprinted in
CoUr Or CHANCERY OF SOUTH CARorIA, 1671-1779, at 208
RECORDS OF T

(A. Gregorie ed. 1950).
58 The editor of the case states that the basis for seeking equitable jurisdiction
here was that a jury was "entirely unfitted to deal with the complexities of facts
usually involved in such an accounting," but there is nothing whatever in the case
to support this assertion. RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF SOUTH
CAmoLnA, 1671-1779, at 47 (A. Gregorie ed. 1950).
59 Bill of Complaint, supra note 57, at 216-17 (emphasis added).
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Nowhere does the bill mention the complicated character of the
case. Indeed, even if one were to discover in the eighteenth-century
archives a case in which equitable jurisdiction rested on complexity,
it would prove only that complexity was a basis for providing an
equitable remedy at the option of the plaintiff. It would not even
suggest the possibility that a plaintiff seeking a legal remedy proper
to the circumstances could be enjoined from doing so.

II.

EQUITY AND COMPLEX CASES IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND

In a recent Article on suits at common law in eighteenthcentury England, Lord Devlin has argued that the chancellor would
sometimes intervene in complex cases "to prevent a purely legal
claim from being tried by jury", 60 and that "[t]he English judicial
attitude toward putting such a task upon a jury has been unchanged
61 The abandonment of the jury in
over two centuries ....
England in recent times is a fact too notorious to dispute, 2 but,
with respect, the assertion that significant antecedents of this attitude existed in a much earlier period is not easily maintained.
Indeed, only two cases are cited in favor of this proposition, and
examination reveals them to be much too frail to support the large
reliance placed upon them.
Towneley v. Clench,63 a chancery suit decided by Ellesmere in
1603, is the first such case, and, although quite interesting, it is
terribly obscure. The short report as Cary has it follows:
Inter Tomley and Clench, it appeared by testimony of
ancient witnesses speaking of sixty years before, and account books and other writings, that Francis Vaughan,
from whom Tomley claimed, was mulier [i.e. legitimate];
and Anthony, from whom Clench claimeth, was a bastard;
and the possession had gone with Tomley fifty years. In
this case the Lord Egerton not only decreed the possession
with Tomley, but ordered also that Clench should not
have any trial at the common law for his right till he had
shewed better matter in the Chancery, being a thing so
long past; it rested not properly in notice de pais, but to
be discerned by books and deeds, of which the Court was
better able to judge then a jury of ploughmen, notwith60

Devlin, supra note 1, at 74.

61 id.76.
62 See, e.g., J.BAxsn, AN

(2d ed.
1979).
63
Clench

INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL

v. Tomley, Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603).

Cary reverses the parties and misspells the plaintiff's name.

ISTORY 80-81
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standing that exceptions were alleged against those ancient
writings; and that for the copyhold land, the verdict went
with Clench upon evidence given three days before Serjeant Williams that Anthony was mulier (31st May, 1
Jacob. 1603)."
In order to understand why it is so difficult to interpret this
report with real confidence it is first necessary to recall the nature
of early seventeenth-century reporting. Reports in this period were
in no sense "official"; indeed, official reports would not appear in
England or America until well after the seventh amendment was
adopted.65 Until then, the books printed as "reports" could have
had several different original purposes: they might have been, as in
the medieval Year-Book tradition, the notes of students present in
court; '" or they might have been the notes of counsel or judges
participating in the litigation. 7 In no sense were they complete:
not every case was reported, and not every aspect of reported cases
received attention. Rarely was there anything resembling the
opinions of modem American law reports. Most likely this was
because the breadth of the jury's power over results left professionals few opportunities to speak on the legal significance of facts.
Not until the early nineteenth century did anxiety over the power
and authority of judges produce demands for official reports. Before then, the idea of stare decisis was simply not well established
in substantive matters and the need for control of judge and jury
was not a cause for great concem. 8
Against this background the relatively unscientific and imprecise character of early reports is easy to understand. The reporter
in Towneley v. Clench does not even bother to tell us the exact
nature of the bill initiating the suit. A first reading of the case
suggests that it might well belong to a class of land cases that equity
began to entertain in the sixteenth century because one party was
withholding "deeds and evidences" from the other; 69 those cases
seem to be prototypes of that head of equity jurisdiction grounded
(emphasis in original).
See generally W. DANIEr, THE HISTORY

64Id.

65

(1884).
66

AND Ommn

oF THE

L.w

Basoar

See J. BAxER, supra note 62, at 152-53; Introduction to I YEA BooKs oF
III, at ix, xiii (F. Maitland ed.) (Selden Society Vol. 17, 1903).
67 See J. BAmR, supra note 62, at 153-58; J. DAwsoN, THm ORAcI s OF THE
LAw 76 (1968). Many of the cases reported by Coke were of this variety.
68 This is one theme of J. DAWSON, supra note 67, Oh. 1 passim.
69 Dr. Edith Henderson of the Harvard Law School very kindly suggested this
possibility to me.
EDwAD
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on the availability of discovery in chancery. One could also
speculate-and there is nothing in the meagre report to indicate
otherwise-that the case was brought evoking the quia timet jurisdiction of equity. In light of these alternative possibilities, it seems
highly unwarranted, simply on the evidence of the report in Cary,
to take the unprecedented view that the basis for equity jurisdiction
was the complexity of the case.
A search of the early chancery records in the Public Record
Office in London 70 has now revealed the actual basis for invoking
equitable jurisdiction in Towneley v. Clench. The bill recites that
Bedolph, a co-defendant, had taken the plaintiff's "evidences of
title" from the plaintiff's servant by force. These evidences came
into the possession of the defendant Clench, making it impossible
for the plaintiff's lessee to defend against an ejectment suit which
Clench's lessee brought at law. 1 The bill also mentions the difficulty that most of the pertinent witnesses were in the islands of
Guernsey and Jersey. It explains further that the defendant
claimed by virtue of the right of his wife Mary Clench, 72 who
claimed through Anthony Vaughan, the bastard son of Sir Hugh
Vaughan, and that the plaintiff claimed as the devisee of Sir Hugh's
legitimate son Francis. The plaintiff therefore prayed a subpoena. 78
Within two weeks the defendant answered, setting out the claim
of title which the plaintiff had attributed to him but denying that
Anthony was a bastard. 4 Three months later Francis Bacon, on
behalf of the plaintiff informed that his client had been in peaceable possession for forty years and that the defendant was claiming
through Anthony, who was "known to have been a bastard." 75
The court issued a temporary injunction against the ejectment proceedings at law "until the matter should be determined in
Chancery." 76 The next month the defendant successfully requested
70

Dr. J. H. Baker of Cambridge very kindly made the search of the records

for me and furnished me with abstracts and transcripts on which the following
discussion is based. All quotations, unless otherwise noted, are from Dr. Baker's
notes, which are paraphrases of the original records in modem English spelling.
A copy of Dr. Baker's notes is on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law

Review.
71 Bill on behalf of Francis Towneley, Towneley v. Clench (sworn Jan. 24,
1600 [i.e., 1601]), Public Record Office, London, [hereinafter cited as P.R.O.]
C2/Eliz/T3/60.
72 The defendant was Thomas Clench of Lincoln's Inn.
73
74

P.R.O. C2/Eliz/T3/60 (Jan. 24, 1600 [i.e., 1601]).
Answer of Thomas Clench, Towneley v. Clench (sworn Feb. 7, 1600 [i.e.,

1601]), F.R.O. C2/Eliz/T3/60.
75 P.R.O. C33/99, fol. 462v (May 7, 1601); id. C33/100, fol. 450.
76 Id.
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an order requiring the plaintiff to find a surety for the mesne
profits.

77

There followed some procedural skirmishing which lasted more
than a year. Then, in May of 1602, the defendant Clench moved
that the injunction be lifted "since the principal question is whether
Anthony Vaughan was a bastard, which is meet to be tried at common law." 78 In June, the court denied the motion, partly on the
ground that the "plaintiff does not wholly insist on the point of
bastardy but upon some other question." 79 Final judgment was
not rendered until almost a year later, on May 31, 1603. The decree
stated as a finding of fact that Anthony was a bastard, born to Dame
Blanch, the last wife of Sir Hugh, before they were married and
during his prior marriage to Dame Anne Hungerford, whereas
Francis, through whom the plaintiff claimed, was a legitimate son
of Sir Hugh and Dame Blanch. 0 The court indicated that this
finding was supported by much evidence. First, the court rolls from
several manors of presentments made in the time of Queen Mary
stated that Francis had been found heir to George the eldest (legitimate) son of Hugh despite the fact that depositions of witnesses
read in court indicated that Anthony was much older than George.
Second, Sir Hugh's will entailed the lands first to George, then to
Francis, and then to Anthony; this was taken as circumstantial
evidence that Anthony was not legitimate. The court's conclusions
are worthy of full quotation:
[T]herefore, and because it appeareth that the possession
of the said lands hath for the space of about fifty years
gone and continued with the said Francis Vaughan and
with the plaintiff who claims from him, and that the plaintiff's evidences concerning the said lands were by force and
violence taken away by the said Bedolph [a codefendant]
from the plaintiff's servant as he was carrying them in the
open street, and the same were shortly after brought to the
said Clench by the said Bedolph, whereby it is supposed
the plaintiff may be disabled to maintain his title at the
common law, IT Is ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED BY
THIS COURT that the plaintiff . . . hold . . . the possession of the manors, lands and tenements . . . until better

matter shall be showed in this Court to the contrary.8 '
7"P.R.O. C33/99, fol 672 (June 26, 1601).
78P.R.O. C33/102, fol 584 (May 17, 1602).

79 P.R.O. C33/102, fol. 674v (June 14, 1602).
80 P.R.O. C33/103, fol. 681 (May 31, 1603).
81 Id. (direct quotation with spelling modernized by Dr. Baker, see note 70

-supra).
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A number of interesting and pertinent observations are made
possible by this new evidence on the nature of the dispute in
Towneley v. Clench. For one thing, it is significant that the plaintiff at no time made the claim that equitable jurisdiction rested
on the complexity of the case. Indeed, the facts seem remarkably
simple. The difficulty, as the record reveals, was that legal process
in the law courts was inadequate for Towneley in two ways: first,
there was no subpoena power to compel the production of the
purloined documents; second, there was no power to compel witnesses to appear. The first difficulty could be overcome in equity
by ordering a return of the documents, although Towneley seems
never to have accomplished this; the second evidently was overcome by taking the depositions of the pertinent witnesses. Thus
the obvious basis for jurisdiction was the superior process available
in equity.
Moreover, the decree itself does not mention the supposed inferiority of jury trial as a reason for denying the defendant his
right to sue at common law. It mentions only the plaintiff's apparent right and the fact that the defendant had contrived to render
the plaintiff's defense at law impossible. When the decree says that
the injunction will be lifted only if "better matter shall be showed,"
the meaning is clear: the defendant has possession of the relevant
documents and he can come forward with them if he believes them
helpful to his cause. The decree proceeds on the assumption that
the relevant evidence was being withheld, not that it would be too
complex for the jury if it were made available. Thus, the records
of the proceedings indicate that the official reasons for denying the
defendant his ordinary recourse to law were unremarkable, routine,
and wholly unrelated to the mode of trial afforded by the commonlaw courts.
Even if we assume, arguendo, that Ellesmere made the condescending statement attributed to him by Cary, 82 it does not follow
that the Chancellor meant to create a new font of equity jurisdiction
grounded in complexity. One needs to recall that in this period
the jury was still said to possess an investigative function and might
be expected to come to court with some knowledge of the facts.
This suggests that Ellesmere can be understood to have found
simply that cases requiring notice of ancient facts are not suitable
for jury trial.8 3 According to this interpretation, Ellesmere's ob82

See text accompanying note 64 supra. Dr. Baker was unable to locate any

report of the case other than that made by Cary.
83 Hence Cary's report says, speaking of the critical event in the case: "being
it rested not properly in notice de pais." Towneley v. Clench,

a thing so long past;
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jection that a "jury of ploughmen" might not be the most competent body to examine and understand account books and writings
is thus beside the point. In any case, the law courts would soon
attempt to overcome such objections by making the interpretation
of most documents a matter of law.
In the days before they became official, law reports often
featured asides from those who were doing the reporting. This was
an old tradition, and sometimes some fairly unflattering remarks
about judgments were preserved. At the end of the report of
Towneley v. Clench, the reporter, said to be Mr. William Lambert, 8
indicates his surprise over, and disagreement with, Ellesmere's conclusion. He implies that the decision cannot be supported because
the evidence relied upon was controverted by Clench, and he points
out, moreover, that Clench had only recently won a judgment for
copyhold land on the same evidence. The record of the case supports the reporter on this point by revealing that the court actually
quieted the title to this land in Clench on his motion.
In any
event, Ellesmere's novel opinion was apparently never regarded as
authority later, and there is no evidence that its principles, whatever they might have been, were ever again invoked. Indeed,
Towneley v. Clench is so obscure that it had entirely escaped the
notice of most commentators until recently, when it became necessary to ransack the old books in search of a distinguished parentage
for what is really a relatively new idea-that a jury may be denied a
plaintiff on the ground that the case is "too complex." The most
recent scholarly look at the clash between law and equity in the
seventeenth century does not even so much as mention the case.86
Finally, in assessing the significance of Ellesmere's remark, one
needs to keep in mind that the Lord Keeper's imperious style was
not regarded as something worthy of emulation by his successors.
His hostile and competitive feelings toward the law courts of the
age, and in particular his difficulties with Coke, have not left his
memory entirely unblemished. In the years following his time as
Chancellor, law and equity learned to accommodate each other,
and the condescending attitude toward juries attributed to Ellesmere by Cary would not have won the approval of succeeding
generations.
Cary 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1603). This rationale, of course, can have no
application to modem juries.
84 J. WAI.LA CE, THE REPoRTmRs 469 (4th ed. 1882) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1844).

85 P.R.O. C33/99, fol. 672 (June 26, 1601).
86 See generally L. KArLA, LAW AND PoLrncs

IN JAcoBEAN ENGLAND

(1977).
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The second English case said to support the view that equity
would claim exclusive jurisdiction over complex cases is Blad v.
Bamfield,87 decided by Lord Nottingham in 1674. Bamfield and
other Englishmen brought common-law actions against Blad, a
Dane, for seizing goods from their ships plying the waters of Iceland.
Blad brought suit in chancery to stay the proceedings at law, alleging that the King of Denmark had by patent granted him a
monopoly which the defendants had violated. Bamfield replied
that such a patent, if proved, would be illegal and a breach of a
recent treaty. In granting Blad's prayer for a permanent injunction, the Lord Chancellor noted that the case properly belonged to
chancery because it was a trespass on the high seas and chancery
had admiralty jurisdiction; an action at common law would mean
that the court would have to "pretend to judge of the validity of the
king's letters patent in Denmark, or of the exposition and meaning
of the articles of peace." s Moreover, he counted it "monstrous and
absurd" to allow a "common jury" to "try whether the English
have a right to trade in Iceland." 89 This case stands for the simple
proposition that suits involving foreign relations ought to be tried
in prerogative courts: it is not the complexity of the case which
renders it unsuitable for trial in a common-law forum, but the
source of the rights claimed. Today, of course, there would be no
reason why such cases could not be submitted to juries: ample jurycontrol techniques exist so that complicated matters of foreign and
domestic law may ultimately be ruled on by judges. 90 Certainly
there is no longer any concept like that of a prerogative court which
stands in the way. On any reading, the case gives slim support to
the view that complexity is a reason for withdrawing a case from
a jury.
III. CONCLUSION

It is true that the claim was made in the nineteenth century
that certain cases, including those involving accounts, belonged to
the concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity because they were in
some sense "complex." So Mr. Justice Story, a champion of equity
who, as a young Massachusetts legislator, introduced an abortive
bill to create a chancery court there, 91 complained early in that
Swan. 604 (App.), 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674).
88 Id. 607, 36 Eng. Rep. at 993 (emphasis in original).
Sld. (emphasis in original).
90
See Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32
STAN. L. ftv. 99, 116-20 (1979).
873

91

Curran, supra note 34, at 274.
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century of the difficulty of trying commercial cases to juries.92 It
may well be that Story's objection to jury trials in such cases was
that the jury might have difficulty in understanding the matters in
issue; we have seen that in this period such claims were being
made. 9 3 But the original extension of equity into the accounting
area could not have been on this ground because juries did not try
accounts anyway; they merely determined whether the defendant
ought to be put to an accounting before auditors. Indeed, Blackstone attributes the entry of equity into the area of accounting to
the availability of discovery in equity courts. 94 In any case, accounting is an obvious area for equity to occupy: it usually involves
relationships which entail fiduciary obligations, and even the old
legal action of account recognized that fact in determining amounts
due from accountants.Oe
In 1791, the year of the adoption of the seventh amendment,
James Wilson delivered his famous law lectures at the University
of Pennsylvania. Noting the virtual demise of the action of account at law, he laid that decline to the action's complexity. But
it was not the jury's inability to understand that gave him concern.
He explained:
Accounts never were, by the course of the common law,
brought to trial before a jury. To a jury, indeed, the
general question-ought the party to account-was submitted for its determination. But the adjustment of the
accounts was submitted to auditors, instead of being tried
by a jury. If, upon any article in account, the auditors
cannot agree; or, if agreeing, the parties are not satisfied;
then, upon each point, so litigated, a separate and distinct
issue may be taken, and that issue must be tried by a jury.
In this manner, a hundred issues may be joined in the
same cause, and tried separately by as many juries; but the
general statement of the disputed accounts still remains
before the auditors, and by them the general result from
the whole must be formed and ascertained. This mode of
liquidating accounts judicially at common law, is obviously
exposed to many disadvantages and delays; and, for this
921 J. STORY, COm1

ENTARIEs ON EQurry JuBrS RuDENCE § 451 (Cambridge

1835).
93

See notes 2 & 3 supra & accompanying text.
94 3 W. BLAcxsroNE, COmmENTA1UmS *437.

95 Chief Justice Bel]map, for example, expressed the view that a receiver

-who did nothing to make his receipts productive "will be charged for reasonable
profits." Hastynges v. Beverley, Y.B. Pasch. 2 Rich. 2 (1379), reprinted in YAR
Boom or RIc mut H 121, 122 (M. Arnold ed. 1975).
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reason, the action of account has, in a great measure, fallen
into disuse. In England, the parties in unsettled and litigated accounts have recourse to chancery; in Pennsylvania,
to arbitrators, or to jurors acting in the character of
arbitrators. 6
Wilson offered these remarks to demonstrate why the action was
only rarely chosen by plaintiffs; nowhere does he suggest that trial
by jury was not available at the plaintiffs' option.
A diligent search of the available sources has not revealed any
evidence of an eighteenth-century American or English belief that
complexity was a ground for the exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
In the nineteenth century, statements to that effect can be discovered but their lineage is in no sense ancient or otherwise distinguished. On the contrary, there is ample evidence that the jury
was revered in most of the American colonies, so much so that jury
trial found a regular place in chancery, a practice that would have
raised eyebrows in England. Finally, even if one were to concede
the existence of an eighteenth-century head of equitable jurisdiction
premised on complexity, it would nevertheless be true that the cases
said to support it give no indication at all of a jurisdiction that is
exclusive. There thus seems to be no good historical foundation
for the argument that plaintiffs may be denied the right to a jury
trial because their cases are complex. As we have noted,9 7 such
arguments are hardly new; but it is only recently that they have
come to be countenanced in the courts. 98
962 T E Won s OF J mss WiLsoN

492 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).

97See text accompanying notes 2-3 supra.

98See ILC Peripherals v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); SEC v.
Associated Minerals, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1977); In re U.S. Financial

Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979);

Jones v. Orenstein, 73 F.R.D. 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Boise Cascade See.
Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976).

